By Joseph Hernandez
New York State’s debt trajectory is becoming one of the most significant risks to its long-term fiscal stability, yet it is rarely discussed in plain terms. The danger is not only the amount of debt being carried today, but the combined weight of State debt and Metropolitan Transportation Authority debt, how quickly both are growing, and the persistent fiction that these obligations are unrelated.
They are not.
New York State currently carries approximately $62 billion in state-supported debt outstanding. Under the State’s own financial plans, that figure is projected to rise steadily through the end of the decade as new capital commitments are financed through long-term borrowing. At the same time, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority carries roughly $50 billion in outstanding debt today. Public projections show MTA debt rising to between $85 billion and $90 billion within the next ten years if current capital and financing plans continue. And who is the guarantor of that debt? Well, you guessed it. New York State is. You and I!
Taken together, New York taxpayers are already exposed to more than $110 billion in State and transit-related debt, with a credible path toward $150 billion in combined obligations within a decade.
These debts draw from the same economic base.
MTA debt service alone is projected to exceed $6 billion per year within the next decade, more than double current levels. As debt service consumes a larger share of the MTA budget, fewer dollars remain for operations, maintenance, and reliability. When that happens, the State does not step aside. It intervenes.
This pattern is established. During the pandemic, the State provided billions in emergency operating support. In recent years, Albany authorized new and expanded dedicated taxes to support MTA capital plans. When fare revenue underperforms or federal funding is delayed, State subsidies increase. In practice, MTA debt functions as a contingent liability of the State, regardless of how it is categorized in accounting documents.
This has direct consequences for the State budget. Every additional dollar used to stabilize the MTA is a dollar unavailable for education, health care, tax relief, or debt reduction. As both State and MTA debt service grow, fiscal flexibility narrows.
State debt service costs are also rising. Billions of dollars per year are already committed to principal and interest payments, and those obligations increase automatically as new debt is issued. Current affordability metrics rely heavily on optimistic assumptions, including continued strength in personal income tax collections and stable borrowing conditions. Those assumptions are vulnerable to economic downturns, market volatility, and sustained higher interest rates.
Debt compounds risk when discipline is absent.
Borrowing to build infrastructure can be prudent. Borrowing without cost control, performance accountability, or long-term operating discipline is not. The MTA illustrates this clearly. Despite decades of capital investment totaling tens of billions of dollars, riders continue to face reliability problems, safety concerns, and fare pressure. Cost overruns persist. Yet borrowing continues because failure is politically unacceptable.
That reality does not eliminate responsibility. It heightens it.
Responsibility begins with the Governor, who proposes the financial plan and capital agenda. It continues with the Legislature, which authorizes borrowing, taxes, and subsidies. It rests with MTA leadership, which executes spending and operations. And it culminates with the Comptroller, whose duty is to protect taxpayers by evaluating affordability, risk, and long-term sustainability.
As Comptroller, I would treat MTA debt as State-linked risk, not as an accounting technicality. I would require independent affordability analyses before any major new borrowing is approved, evaluating combined State and authority debt, not just individual silos. I would publish clear, plain-language debt reports showing taxpayers how much they are exposed to today, how much is projected, and what that means for future budgets.
I would conduct aggressive audits of MTA capital projects and operating costs, focusing on cost overruns, procurement practices, overtime, and debt service growth. I would oppose the use of one-time revenues to support recurring debt obligations, and I would publicly flag capital plans that create unfunded future operating costs.
Most importantly, I would restore the Comptroller’s role as an independent fiscal guardrail, not a passive observer. When borrowing decisions create long-term instability, I would say so clearly, regardless of political pressure.
Every additional billion dollars of debt commits future taxpayers to obligations they did not choose, reduces flexibility when the economy turns, and increases the likelihood of abrupt tax increases or service cuts in the next downturn.
New York does not lack resources. It lacks discipline and transparency.
The question is not whether the State can continue to borrow. The question is whether it will confront the full scale of its obligations, including MTA debt, and enforce accountability before rising debt becomes a crisis rather than a warning.
That is the responsibility of leadership. And it is exactly the responsibility of the Comptroller. And it is what I intend to do if honored with this most important role.